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Abstract 
In the wake of the financial crisis considerable momentum has built up behind 
proposals to extend central counterparty (CCP) clearing in the over-the-counter 
derivatives markets. However, implementation is proving complex. This paper 
argues that one cause of this complexity is that the public sector is seeking to 
incorporate into legislation (and require the wider use of.) a privately owned and 
operated risk management mechanism. As a matter of law, the paper argues that 
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CCP clearing can be understood as a market-generated ‘legal device’; in other 
words, one designed to support the markets by means of the interaction of various 
private law techniques. Following this analysis through, the paper highlights the 
benefits and drawbacks which derive from the legal techniques underlying CCP 
clearing (standardisation of contracts, asset-backing, netting and so on) and argues 
that these qualities are inherent to the device. It concludes that the inherent capacity 
of CCP clearing gives rise to a qualitatively different set of challenges for policy-
makers to those arising from technical implementation and it explains that both types 
of problem need to be addressed if the CCP prescription is to be effective. 
Keywords: OTC derivatives, credit default swaps, central counterparty clearing, 
CCPs, clearing houses, netting, collateral, contract, Dodd-Frank Act, regulatory 
reform. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally regarded as an important but unglamorous part of the infrastructure of 
the financial markets, commentators have often subjected central counterparty (CCP) 
clearing to metaphors about plumbing.1 CCP clearing services are operated by 
clearing houses such as LCH.Clearnet Ltd or ICE Clear Europe, which are private 
entities authorised and supervised in the UK by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA).2 The job of CCPs is to provide clearing services to members and exchanges, 
reducing risk and increasing efficiencies in the post-trade and pre-settlement period. 
How they achieve these important effects as a matter of law is one of the questions 
which is central to this paper. 
As states and other regulators have considered their responses to the financial 
crisis, CCPs have come to assume a prominent place in the debate. Specifically, the 
recommendation that CCP clearing should be required for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives as a way of increasing transparency and stability in those markets has 
been endorsed by the G20, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, 
                                                                                                                                               
1 For example, ‘Counter Insurgency; The Craze for Clearing Houses’, The Economist, 27 June 
2009 (where CCPs are described as ‘part of the financial plumbing’); ‘Making a Stink; Credit 
Derivatives’, The Economist, 1 July 2006; N. Aubry, ‘Regulating the Plumbing of Europe’, 23 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation (2008) p. 578; and P. Wood, ‘What Is a 
Central Counterparty in the Financial Markets?’,  Allen & Overy, 20 August 2009, noting the usual 
metaphors and expressing a preference for a comparison with cathedral columns, available at: 
<http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/AreasOfExpertise/Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&ite 
mID=52783&prefLangID=410>. (All websites last visited 14 October 2010). 
2 The regulatory framework is discussed in B. Penn, ‘Recognised Investment Exchanges 
(RIEs) and Recognised Clearing Houses (RCHs)’, in M. Blair and G. Walker, eds., Financial 
Markets and Exchanges Law (Oxford, OUP 2007). 
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the Obama administration, and HM Treasury and the FSA amongst others.3 On the 
basis of the shared features of these authorities’ recommendations, I label this reform 
the ‘CCP prescription’ for the OTC derivatives markets. However, as I discuss 
below, this is not to downplay the important differences in detail between what 
various parties are proposing. 
While these different national and transnational legislative processes run their 
course, influential market actors have also endorsed the CCP prescription. As early 
as August 2008, the US-based industry group which was set up to provide a ‘private 
sector’ response to the crisis, the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III, 
published a report which amongst other recommendations ‘urge[d] swift industry 
action to create a clearinghouse for OTC derivatives, starting with CDS’.4 In October 
2008, major US dealers and three leading trade associations wrote the President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, committing to seven goals to ‘make OTC 
derivative processing more scalable, transparent and resilient’ including the ‘global 
use of central counterparty processing and clearing to significantly reduce counter-
party credit risk and outstanding net notional positions’.5 In a February 2009 letter to 
European Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, nine of the leading dealer firms in the 
market committed to using EU-based central clearing for ‘eligible EU CDS 
contracts’, as announced by the leading trade association, the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA).6 By August 2009, seven clearing houses for 
CDS had launched or were due to launch shortly in the US (ICE US Trust, CME), 
the UK (NYSE LIFFE/BClear and LCH.Clearnet, and ICE Clear Europe), Germany 
(Eurex) and France (LCH.Clearnet S.A.).7 
However, concluding from all this momentum that the CCP prescription is one of 
the more uncontroversial or straightforward elements of the public sector’s 
                                                                                                                                               
3 The detail of the international consensus behind this reform and its progress into legislation is 
discussed in section 2 of the paper below. 
4 Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III, Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to 
Reform. The Report of the CRMPG III (6 August 2008), at p. 1. ‘CDS’ are credit default swaps 
which are one type of OTC derivative. They have attracted particular attention during the debate 
about the CCP prescription and are discussed in more detail in section 2.1 of the paper below. 
5 Letter from senior managements of sixteen major dealers, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), the Managed Funds Association and the Asset Management 
Group of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association to Timothy F. Geithner, 
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 31 October 2008 (making reference to 
correspondence between the parties earlier in 2008), available at: <http://www.isda.org>. 
6 ISDA, ‘Major Firms Commit to EU Central Counterparty for CDS’, News Release, 19 
February 2009. ISDA’s role in reforming the derivatives industry, including in the context of 
clearing initiatives, is discussed in more detail in R. Pickel, ‘Navigating the Financial Crisis: 
Choosing the Right Path for the Derivatives Industry’, 4(S1) Capital Markets Law Journal (2009) 
p. S69. 
7 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, Credit Default Swaps and Counterparty Risk, August 
2009, at p. 77, available at: <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/creditdefaultswapsandcounterparty 
risk2009en.pdf>. 
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legislative response to the financial crisis would be a mistake. In fact, as the public 
debates surrounding the issue reveal, settling the detail of new legislation to mandate 
further CCP clearing of OTC derivatives has turned out to be an extremely difficult 
task, involving technical decisions on a host of matters. The public debates thus far 
have addressed a range of such matters simultaneously, including what types of 
derivatives the reform should cover, what qualities are needed for a derivatives 
contract to be ‘clearing eligible’, whether clearing should be mandatory or recom-
mended, how non-cleared (or non-clearable) contracts should be regulated, where 
CCPs should be located, how many there should be, who should bail them out and so 
on. Each of these details goes to the heart of how the CCP prescription will work 
and, if not confronted effectively, threatens to frustrate any new rules which 
policymakers produce about clearing in the OTC derivatives market. 
Against this background, there are several ways in which academics might seek 
to contribute to the debate, including by considering why the CCP prescription has 
come to overshadow other regulatory approaches. However, this paper focuses on 
the nature and capacity of CCP clearing itself and the consequences for the debate 
about the public sector’s implementation of the CCP prescription. The emphasis in 
this paper is on the role of private law, which has featured less prominently in the 
debates than some other perspectives,8 but which offers valuable insights into the 
process of implementing this reform.9 The thesis which I advance in this paper is 
that: 
(1) implementing the CCP prescription is proving complex in part because the 
public sector is seeking to incorporate into legislation (and require the wider use 
of.) a privately owned and operated risk management mechanism. However, the 
implications of incorporating mandatory CCP clearing into financial regulatory 
reform have not been addressed in a systematic way in the public debates, which 
have tended to ask ‘how will this reform work?’ rather than first dealing with the 
question of ‘how does CCP clearing work?’. 
                                                                                                                                               
8 For example, academics from the disciplines of finance and economics were well-represented 
at the high-level conference organised by the European Commission on 25 September 2009 to 
conclude its public consultation on OTC derivatives markets. The agenda and materials from this 
conference are available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/derivatives/ 
index_en.htm>. There has also been some input to the CCP debate from practising lawyers. For 
example, a detailed discussion by an experienced securities lawyer, covering the history of 
regulatory interest in OTC derivatives, changes to documentation and market practice and 
addressing the limits on the kinds of OTC credit derivatives that can be cleared is set out in A. 
Glass, ‘The Regulatory Drive towards Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Credit Derivatives 
and the Necessary Limits on This’, 4(S1) Capital Markets Law Journal (2009) p. S79. 
9 Indeed, as I suggest in section 3 of the paper, a private law analysis is a valuable way in 
which to consider the function and capacity of a range of complex, market-generated legal devices. 
This mode of analysis therefore has the potential to contribute to the debates about regulatory 
reform in a number of areas beyond the OTC derivatives market. 
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(2) CCP clearing can be analysed in different ways depending on the disciplinary 
perspective being used, but as a matter of law it can be understood as a market-
generated ‘legal device’; in other words, it is designed to serve the markets by 
means of the interaction of various private law techniques. Following this analy-
sis through highlights the benefits but also the drawbacks which derive from the 
underlying legal techniques (standardisation of contracts, asset-backing, netting 
and so on). 
(3) These strengths and weaknesses are inherent to the device. This means that they 
have to be recognised and managed upfront by policymakers intending to incor-
porate CCP clearing of OTC derivatives into their regulatory response to the 
financial crisis. 
(4) The inherent capacity of CCP clearing represents a qualitatively different set of 
challenges for policymakers to those arising from the implementation of the CCP 
prescription; however, both types of problem need to be addressed if the CCP 
prescription is to be effective. 
The rest of this paper is organised into three main parts. The first provides the 
background to the CCP prescription, charting the problems which have been 
diagnosed in parts of the OTC derivatives markets in the wake of the financial crisis, 
the emergence of the official consensus behind an extension of CCP clearing and the 
ongoing attempts to settle the detail of this reform. 
The following part considers the function and capacity of CCP clearing. Contex-
tualising CCP clearing alongside other ‘legal devices’ which facilitate market 
activity, I argue that the benefits and weaknesses of such devices are usefully 
highlighted by taking a private law perspective. I go on to consider, as a matter of 
English law, the legal techniques underlying CCP clearing as a way of understanding 
the capacity of this particular legal device. 
The next part of the paper returns to the ongoing policy debates about the CCP 
prescription. On the basis of the preceding analysis, I suggest that it is helpful to 
isolate two different types of challenges confronting policymakers. The paper 
concludes with thoughts about how the debates about the CCP prescription may 
usefully proceed. 
2. THE CCP PRESCRIPTION FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
The financial crisis which began in 2007 with, as Lord Turner has put it, ‘an initial 
crack in confidence and collapse of liquidity’10 brought the international banking 
                                                                                                                                               
10  A. Turner, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London, 
FSA, March 2009), at p. 27. George Soros has also written that ‘the outbreak of the current financial 
crisis can be officially fixed at August 2007’: G. Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: 
The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means (New York, PublicAffairs 2008), at p. xiii. 
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system to the brink of collapse and continues to have devastating effects on the real 
economy. Since then, a significant part of the debate about ‘what went wrong’11 and 
what should happen now has focused on the OTC derivatives markets. 
2.1 OTC derivatives and the financial crisis 
OTC derivatives are often defined as those derivatives which are entered into 
privately rather than on an organised exchange. This is a useful definition, though in 
practice the distinction is not always this clear cut.12 The most important types of 
OTC derivatives are interest rate, credit, foreign exchange, equity and commodities 
derivatives. As discussed below, new and proposed legislation mandating CCP 
clearing seeks to catch all types of OTC derivatives (exceptions in the legislation 
published so far turn on the nature of the party entering the contract, not the type of 
derivative in question). However, the momentum for this reform originated in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, when the debate focused on credit default swaps 
(CDS), a type of credit derivative. 
Legally speaking, a CDS is a bilateral contract where the rights and obligations of 
the parties derive not from the price of a commodity or a currency (as in other sorts 
of derivatives) but from the credit risk of a reference entity or asset.13 Under a CDS 
contract, a ‘protection buyer’14 contracts with a counterparty and in return for a 
premium buys protection against particular credit events (which should be carefully 
defined in the contract).15 CDS emerged as a class of OTC product in the mid-1990s, 
and since then, the growth of the market has been staggering.16 However, by the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2007, various factors had made this market particularly 
fragile. The Turner Review, for instance, drew attention to the ‘sheer size and 
complexity of the market and the fact that it is traded in an almost entirely Over-the-
counter (OTC) fashion’.17 
                                                                                                                                               
11  The title of the Turner Review, ibid., chapter 1. 
12  As demonstrated in E. Murray, ‘UK Financial Derivatives Commodities Markets’, in Blair 
and Walker, eds., supra n. 2, at pp. 273-4. 
13  See the definition of derivatives generally in J. Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford, OUP 
2007), at p. 65. 
14  To use the term which is central to Benjamin’s thesis of financial law, Benjamin, ibid. 
15  The obligations of the protection buyer and seller under a single name CDS are helpfully set 
out in diagrammatic form in D. Rule, ‘The Credit Derivatives Market: Its Development and 
Possible Implications for Financial Stability’, in The Bank of England Financial Stability Review 
(June 2001) p. 117, at p. 118. See also the detailed explanation as to ‘What Are CDSs and How Are 
They Used?’, in European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at pp. 9-10. 
16  For example, the European Central Bank/Eurosystem notes that the CDS market rose by 
900% in the three years to the end of 2007 by which point it had a gross nominal value of $58 
trillion (European Central Bank/Eurosystem, ‘OTC Derivatives and Post-Trading Infrastructures’ 
(September 2009), at p. 13). 
17  Turner Review, supra n. 10, at p. 82. 
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The extraordinary complexity which evolved in this part of the OTC derivatives 
market has now been widely documented.18 In particular, the use of CDS not in ‘single-
name’ products.19 but as a ‘building block’20 in complex securitisations which create 
new instruments with ‘synthetic’ exposure to a portfolio of assets,21 has become a hot 
topic for economists and other commentators considering the build-up to the financial 
crisis. For example, the proliferation of complex securitised products attracted detailed 
analysis in the Turner Review.22 and in 2009, the US Department of the Treasury stated 
that the risk characteristics of CDS used in asset-backed securitisations proved to be 
‘poorly understood even by the most sophisticated of market participants’.23 Elsewhere, 
one (lay) author has suggested that no one understood these complex structured 
products at the time.24 and even the most expert financial services commentators have 
resorted to magic-referencing metaphors in their attempts to convey the complexity 
involved. Howard Davies, for instance, talks of the ‘complex alchemy’ of securitisa-
tions,25 while Charles Morris (whose software company made tools for ‘building and 
analysing … securitised asset pools’26) writes of how ‘highly rated bonds magically 
materialize out of a witches’ soup of very smoky stuff.’.27 
The Turner Review adds another dimension to concerns about this market by 
explaining that certain CDS contracts may themselves contribute to the insolvency 
risk of participants. This problem arises because a CDS may require parties to post 
                                                                                                                                               
18  For example, see the 2009 European Central Bank/Eurosystem report which called CDS 
‘opaque credit risk instruments’, European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at p. 4. The 
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services has commented of CDS that ‘the 
opaqueness of these products leads to nasty surprises when things go wrong’, European 
Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services Charlie McCreevy, ‘Time for Regulators to Get a 
Better View of Derivatives: Statement on Reviewing Derivatives Markets before the End of the 
Year’ (Brussels, 17 October 2008), Speech/08/538. 
19  Where CDS provide protection with respect to individual reference entities or assets, see 
Rule, supra n. 15, at pp. 118-119. 
20  Ibid., at p. 140. 
21  Ibid., at pp. 120-121. 
22  For example, see the discussion of the ‘wave of financial innovation focused on the 
origination, packaging, trading and distribution of securitised credit instruments’, in Turner 
Review, supra n. 10, at p. 14, and the subsequent discussion of complex products at pp. 22 and 28. 
23  US Department of the Treasury, ‘Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: 
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation’ (undated), at p. 47. 
24  The playwright David Hare concluded in a recent play (through which he ‘seeks to 
understand the financial crisis’) that ‘[n]obody understood them. Even Alan Greenspan … he didn’t 
understand them… He said he had hundreds of people with PhDs working for him and they didn’t 
understand them either’, D. Hare, The Power of Yes (London, Faber and Faber 2009), at p. 34. 
25  H. Davies, ‘With the Benefit of Hindsight: Lessons from the Credit Crisis for Banks, 
Regulators and Central Banks’, speech, 10 November 2008, at p. 3, transcript available at: <http:// 
www2.lse.ac.uk/aboutLSE/meetTheDirector/speechesAndLectures/home.aspx>. 
26  C. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers and the Great Credit 
Crash (London, PublicAffairs Ltd 2008), at p. xvi. 
27  Ibid., at p. 79. 
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collateral (i.e., certain types of assets.28) during the life of the swap in order to address 
the increased credit risk of their counterparty. While the provision of collateral is an 
increasingly popular way of mitigating risk in the OTC markets,29 the Turner Review 
notes that it may also ‘produce disruptive procyclical effects’.30 In other words, a 
vicious circle might be set off if party A is required to post collateral to its CDS 
counterparty once A’s credit rating is downgraded. This is because providing 
collateral may undermine A’s position further, triggering the requirement to post 
more collateral and so on, potentially pushing the party into insolvency. As the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) put it in March 2007, 
‘linking margin requirements to downgrades in credit ratings in particular can give 
rise to extraordinary demands for collateral’.31 
These risks crystallised in 2008 in the case of the near-collapse of the American 
Insurance Group (AIG). Many of AIG Financial Products’ bespoke CDS with 
European banks included these ‘credit rating triggers’ for posting collateral. As a 
result, in the 15 days or so that followed its credit ratings downgrade on 15 
September 2008, AIG Financial Products had to fund approximately US$32 billion 
of collateral calls and eventually had to be bailed out by the US Government.32 This 
rescue was in part driven by the large net selling position the insurer had in the CDS 
market, as a counterparty to CDS of over US$400 billion.33 Thus, had AIG collapsed 
in such a ‘highly concentrated’34 market, it would have left very many ‘protection 
buyers’ without the protection of their CDS contracts. As the European Central 
Bank/Eurosystem review put it, these counterparties would have ‘instantly been 
forced to reappraise the value of the underlying corporate debt obligations…. It was 
widely considered that the expected knock-on effects for the already destabilised 
financial system would have been far-reaching’.35 
Thus, given the ‘increased contagion risk’ within this deeply ‘interconnected’ 
market,36 the vicious circle effect of credit rating triggers is particularly ominous. 
                                                                                                                                               
28  The meaning of financial collateral is discussed further in section 3 of the paper. 
29  In 2000, US$200 billion was posted to support OTC derivatives exposures and there were 
12,000 collateral agreements. By the end of 2005, US$1.3 trillion was posted and there were 
110,000 collateral agreements: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, New 
Developments in Clearing and Settlement Arrangements for OTC Derivatives (Bank for 
International Settlements, March 2007), at p. 21. 
30  Turner Review, supra n. 10, at p. 82. 
31  Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra n. 29, at p. 24. 
32  European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at p. 30. See also the account of the 
aftermath of AIG’s downgrading in Glass, supra n. 8, at p. S88. 
33  European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at p. 29. 
34  Ibid., at p. 4. 
35  European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 16, at p. 11, at fn. 17, as well as European 
Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at p. 28 (describing AIG as ‘too interconnected and too big to 
fail’). 
36  European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at pp. 4-5. 
Inherent Limits of ‘Legal Devices’ for the OTC Derivatives Markets 95
The global financial crisis and, in particular, the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
(another major participant in the CDS market) and near-collapse of AIG therefore 
drew regulatory attention to the build-up of systemic risk within the CDS market. In 
turn, the diagnosis of fragility and ‘interconnectedness’ within the CDS market 
jump-started the debate about extending CCP clearing. As Glass put it, and as the 
paper demonstrates below, ‘the current financial crisis has been a game-changer for 
the prospect of CCP clearing of credit derivatives’.37 
2.2 The prescription: worldwide proposals to extend CCP clearing 
As the causes of the crisis were being studied by regulators around the world, a 
consensus quickly formed behind the proposal to extend CCP clearing to CDS. 
Significantly, the leaders of the G20 made a commitment to this reform relatively 
early on. The document produced at their April 2009 London Summit stated: ‘We 
will promote the standardisation and resilience of credit derivatives markets, in 
particular through the establishment of central clearing counterparties subject to 
effective regulation and supervision.’38 
The G20 followed up in September 2009 with a more detailed agreement. Nota-
bly, this document extended the types of OTC derivatives which were being targeted, 
stating that: 
All standardised OTC derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivatives contracts should be 
reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to 
higher capital requirements.39 
This broader proposal to require CCP clearing across all OTC derivatives markets 
has subsequently framed the international debate, as discussed below. For some 
regulators at least, addressing OTC derivatives generally rather than just CDS seems 
to have been driven by concern about producing overly technical rules which could 
be flaunted by using different classes of OTC products,40 and it is now the approach 
adopted by each of the authorities considered below. 
                                                                                                                                               
37  Glass, supra n. 8, at p. S81. 
38  G20, ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System’ (London, 2 April 2009), under 
heading ‘The Scope of Regulation’, available at: <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html>. 
39  G20, ‘Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit’ (Pittsburgh, 24-25 September 2009), at 
paragraph 13, available at: <http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm>. 
40  For example, see European Commission, ‘Ensuring Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives 
Markets: Future Policy Actions’ (October 2009), COM(2009) 563, at p. 3 (‘a comprehensive policy 
on derivatives is necessary in order to avoid market participants exploiting differences in rules, i.e. 
regulatory arbitrage’). 
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While it is not the objective here to explore the regulatory dynamics behind 
different authorities’ positions on the CCP prescription,41 at the outset, the core 
content of the CCP prescription – mandating the use of private clearing houses which 
are already up and running in other parts of the OTC markets – may well have 
seemed a relatively uncontroversial and uncomplicated option for regulators 
grappling with a myriad of difficult reforms in the wake of the crisis.42 However, 
implementation of this reform has proven challenging, highly technical and even 
controversial. Indeed, the debate over the last eighteen months or so has seen various 
national and international authorities begin to diverge and even openly disagree with 
one another about what this reform should look like in practice. 
2.2.1 The UK 
In a December 2009 publication, the FSA and HM Treasury reiterated that they 
‘strongly support’ the extension of CCP clearing in the OTC derivatives markets.43 
However, amongst other reservations, the report expressed concern about the G20’s 
proposals that ‘all standardised derivatives contracts’ be cleared, arguing that there is 
more to being ‘clearing eligible’ than a contract simply being made on standardised 
terms.44 In particular, it drew attention to the need for there to be sufficient market 
liquidity to support clearing services. In support of this argument, the report noted 
that that clearing was already underway in the CDS market, but only for narrow 
classes of the most liquid products, leaving a ‘large proportion’ of important types of 
CDS unclearable.45 
In June 2009, the Bank of England also expressed its support for the CCP prescrip-
tion, though in tightly drafted terms which referred to the ‘expansion of the use of 
central counterparties for the clearing of vanilla over-the-counter (OTC) instruments’.46 
Moreover, its report cautioned that in the case of CDS contracts particular care would 
be needed in the manner in which arrangements were set up, for example, to ensure 
that clearing houses manage their own risk effectively.47 Indeed there is evidence that 
such challenges associated with CCP clearing for OTC derivatives have concerned the 
                                                                                                                                               
41  For a helpful chronological discussion of the national and international proposals about 
extending CCP clearing for CDS, see European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at pp. 76-79. 
42  For the European Commission alone, the legislative agenda includes the regulation of 
alternative investment funds and credit rating agencies, addressing risk management in financial 
institutions, new rules on financial conglomerates and so on. 
43  FSA and HM Treasury, Reforming OTC Derivative Markets: A UK Perspective (December 
2009), at p. 11, available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/reform_otc_derivatives.pdf>. 
44  Ibid., at p. 11. 
45  Ibid., Annex 3 (Overview of CCP clearing for OTC derivatives markets), at pp. 1-2. 
46  Included in a list of areas where the ‘Bank believes change is needed’, Bank of England, 
Financial Stability Report (June 2009), at p. 36, available at: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/fsr/2009/fsr25.htm>. 
47  Ibid., at p. 54. 
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Bank for some time.48 and overall its support for the CCP prescription has been more 
carefully put than that expressed by other authorities. 
2.2.2 The EU 
By contrast, at the EU level extending CCP clearing for all classes of OTC derivatives 
has been embraced with enthusiasm. The Internal Market and Services Commissioner 
stated in October 2008 that ‘[a]t $600 trillion the size of derivatives markets today are 
such that we cannot let this OTC market continue without adequate counter party 
clearing. This is particularly urgent for Credit Default Swaps’.49 
Since then, there have been nearly two years of publications and consultations on 
the detail of the clearing proposal and other aspects of regulatory reform of the 
derivatives market, which have recently culminated in a proposal for a Regulation on 
OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories.50 This proposed 
Regulation mandates CCP clearing for ‘all OTC derivatives which are considered 
eligible’ and which are entered into between financial counterparties or between a 
non-financial counterparty and a financial counterparty in certain circumstances.51 It 
also lays down detailed new rules for the regulation of CCPs themselves.52 and 
requires all market participants to provide specified information about their OTC 
derivatives dealings to trade repositories or a competent authority.53 
However, the proposed Regulation leaves open some fundamentally important 
operational issues. For instance, rather than set out in the face of the Regulation 
which contracts are to be affected, the new European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) is to be responsible for compiling the list of ‘classes of deriva-
tives’54 which are ‘eligible for the clearing obligation’, and a mechanism is outlined 
for how the ESMA is to add new classes to this list.55 Elsewhere in the proposed 
                                                                                                                                               
48  See, for example, Bank of England, Financial Stability Report (April 2007), at p. 54, stating 
that ‘there are several challenges associated with CCP in OTC, as compared with exchange-traded, 
derivatives markets’, available at: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2007/index. 
htm>. 
49  McCreevy, supra n. 18. 
50  Proposal for a Regulation (EC) on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories (Proposed Derivatives Regulation), COM(2010) 484/5; 2010/0250 (COD). 
51  Proposed Derivatives Regulation, Title II, Art. 3(1). Clearing will be required for contracts 
between a financial and non-financial counterparty unless the latter’s transactions relate to its 
commercial activities or fall below a certain threshold, which is to be defined separately: Proposed 
Derivatives Regulation, Title II, Art. 7(2) and (4). 
52  Ibid., Titles III and IV. 
53  Ibid., Title II, Art. 6(1), and Title II, Art. 7(1) (non-financial counterparties only have to 
report positions above a threshold, which will be fixed separately). 
54  This term is defined as derivatives that ‘share common, essential characteristics’. In a 
complex and innovative market, this may not prove to be a very practical definition. Proposed 
Derivatives Regulation, Title I, Art. 2(4). 
55  Ibid., Title II, Art. 4. 
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Regulation, the requirements imposed on parties entering into OTC derivatives 
which cannot be cleared remain surprisingly unspecific, although this is a fundamen-
tal aspect of the reform.56 
The European Commission’s previous publications on this issue have already 
attracted detailed scrutiny within the UK. In March 2010, the House of Lords 
European Union Committee (the ‘Committee’) scrutinised the Commission’s 
Communications of July and October 2009 as part of its mandate to ‘influence’ and 
‘hold to account’ the UK Government.57 One of the issues on which the Committee 
heard expert evidence and eventually reported was the European Commission’s 
recommendation that (in the words of the Committee’s report) ‘as many contracts as 
possible should be cleared through a central counterparty’.58 On this matter, the 
Committee broadly endorsed the European Commission’s approach but expressed 
concern on several critical points of detail. 
By way of example, the House of Lords Committee’s report expressed concern 
about various assumptions which had been made relating to the standardisation of 
OTC derivatives. While approving of industry and the European Commission’s 
efforts to increase the use of standardised products, the report sought to emphasise 
that not all derivatives contracts could be standardised.59 Drawing on evidence 
submitted to the Committee by a number of participants in this market, the report 
also challenged the assumption implicit in various G20 and Commission statements 
that there was symbiosis between contractual standardisation and clearing eligibility. 
Instead, the report found that not all standardised contracts could be cleared (because 
of other prerequisites, like a liquid market) while certain non-standard contracts 
could in fact be eligible for clearing.60 In conclusion, the Committee recommended 
that the Government should encourage the Commission to ‘define carefully’ ‘which 
contracts should be regarded as both standardised and appropriate for clearing’.61 
Bearing in mind the nature of the Regulation now proposed by the Commission 
which, as discussed above, reserves these decisions for the ESMA, it appears that the 
proposed legalisation will not yet have addressed the concerns of the Committee. 
                                                                                                                                               
56  Ibid., Title II, Art. 8. Of course, it remains to be seen how or if these proposals change 
during the legislative process. 
57  House of Lords European Union Committee, The Future Regulation of Derivatives Markets; 
Is the EU on the Right Track? Report with Evidence, HL Paper 93 (10th Report of Session 2009-
10, 31 March 2010), at p. 2 (hereafter, the ‘HL EU Committee Report’). This report saw the 
Committee scrutinise two Communications published by the European Commission: European 
Commission, ‘Ensuring Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets’ (July 2009), COM(2009) 
332, and European Commission, ‘Ensuring Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets: Future 
Policy Actions’ (October 2009), COM(2009) 563. 
58  Ibid., at p. 26. 
59  Ibid., at p. 30. 
60  Ibid., at p. 31. Discussed further in section 3 below. 
61  Ibid., at p. 31. 
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2.2.3 The US 
While the goal is that new EU rules should be ‘in place and operational’ by the end 
of 2012,62 sweeping financial reform regulation has already been passed in the US in 
the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010.63 Amongst its many provisions, the Act provides for compulsory CCP clearing 
in the OTC derivatives markets. Title VII (‘Wall Street Transparency and Account-
ability’, hereafter ‘Title VII’) is the main source of the various new rules for the OTC 
derivatives markets, though there are several provisions elsewhere in the Act that 
will also have a significant impact on participants in these markets.64 
Title VII deals separately with ‘swaps’ which are regulated by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and ‘security-based swaps’ which are the 
responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (together referred 
to here as the ‘Authorities’).65 Though the two categories of swaps are dealt with 
separately in the Act, many of the new rules are similar in both cases and, in any 
event, the Authorities are required to consult with each other and with the prudential 
regulators to coordinate their activities.66 A detailed review of the provisions of the 
Act is outside the scope of this paper. However, some of the main provisions as 
regards the OTC derivatives market are as follows: it will be unlawful to engage in 
either type of swap unless it is submitted for clearing if it ‘is required to be cleared’;67 
all swaps, regardless of whether they are to be cleared or not, will be subject to 
reporting requirements;68 and parties which are ‘Swap Dealers’, ‘Major Swap 
                                                                                                                                               
62  European Commission, ‘Commission Proposal on OTC Derivatives and Market 
Infrastructures – Frequently Asked Questions’ (15 September 2010) MEMO/10/410. 
63  H.R. 4173, signed into law by President Obama on 21 July 2010 (hereafter the ‘Dodd-Frank 
Act’). The scope of the Act is captured by its long title: ‘An Act to promote the financial stability 
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
“too big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.’ 
64  For example, the new limits on banks’ proprietary activities in the Dodd-Frank Act, Title VI 
(‘Improvements to Regulation of Bank and Saving Association Holding Companies and Depository 
Institutions’). 
65  Though these terms are defined in existing legislation, the Act provides that the Authorities 
‘further define’ certain key terms used in Title VII, including swap and security-based swap: Dodd-
Frank Act, s 712(d). 
66  Dodd-Frank Act, s 712(a)(1) and (2). 
67  As regards swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 723(a), inserting a new Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2), s 2(h)(1)(A). As regards security-based swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 763, inserting a new 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), s 3C(a)(1). 
68  As regards swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 727, inserting a new Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2(a)), s 2(a)(13). As regards security-based swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 763, inserting a new 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m), s 13(m). 
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Participants’ or ‘Major Security-Swap Participants’ entering into non-cleared swaps 
will have to meet capital requirements and post initial and variation margin.69 
For the purposes of this discussion, the most relevant new rule in Title VII is that 
which provides for mandatory clearing of both swaps and security-based swaps. 
Importantly, however, this requirement is qualified in several ways in the Act, two of 
which are discussed here. 
First, Title VII does not make it mandatory to clear every type of OTC derivative. 
In fact, both the Authorities and clearing houses have input into deciding for which 
products or classes of products it will be required. The Authorities have responsibil-
ity for conducting reviews ‘on an ongoing basis’ of those products for which clearing 
is required. The clearing agencies have input as they can submit products which they 
want to clear to the Authorities for a review, which will be conducted with reference 
to a list of factors including the effect on systemic risk, trading liquidity and so on. 
The Act provides that all products currently being cleared are deemed submitted for 
review by the Authorities. Crucially, though, the Act makes it clear that clearing 
houses cannot be forced by the Authorities to clear a product that would threaten 
their ‘financial integrity’. There are also back-up provisions in case clearing of a 
particular product is required but no clearing house will take it, including that the 
Authorities have the power to require the parties to post collateral, on the basis of 
‘the public interest’.70 
The second qualification to the mandatory rule is provided by a series of exemp-
tions. These include the ‘end-user’ exemption for parties that are not a ‘financial 
entity’, which are using swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk and which notify 
the CFTC or SEC about how they meet their financial obligations in relation to the 
swaps.71 Again, various important definitions included in this exemption have been 
reserved for later rule-making by the Authorities (for example, the definition of a 
‘substantial position’ that informs the definition of a ‘Major Swap Participant’, 
which is one sort of ‘financial entity’72). 
                                                                                                                                               
69  The meaning of which is explained in section 3 of the paper. As regards swaps: Dodd-Frank 
Act, s 731, inserting new Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), s 4s(e)(2)(A) and (B). As 
regards security-based swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 764, inserting new Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), s 15F(e)(2)(A) and (B). 
70  As regards swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 723. As regards security-based swaps: Dodd-Frank 
Act, s 763. 
71  As regards swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 723, inserting a new Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 2), s 2(h)(7). As regards security-based swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 763, inserting a new 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), s 3C(g). 
72  See definition of ‘Major Swap Participant’, referencing ‘substantial position’ at Dodd-Frank 
Act, s 721, referenced in the definition of ‘financial entity’ at Dodd-Frank Act, s 723, inserting a 
new Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2), s 2(h)(7). 
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Overall, this Act is, in the words of one law firm, ‘massive’.73 Title VII alone 
represents a major overhaul of US financial regulation and, when combined with 
provisions elsewhere in the Act, it will dramatically change the regulatory landscape 
of the OTC derivatives markets. However, as with much of the rest of the Act, 
definitions of fundamentally important terms, key details about how the provisions 
will actually work in practice and secondary rules which are needed to flesh out the 
new regulatory framework have been reserved for the Authorities and other 
regulators. For that reason, the debate about how the CCP prescription should work 
in practice still has a long way to go, even in the US. 
2.2.4 The CCP prescription so far 
The story of the CCP prescription so far can therefore be characterised as one which 
started with high-level principles expressed by authorities keen to respond promptly 
to the weaknesses which the financial crisis revealed in the CDS market. Since then, 
it is possible to track the emergence of a broad, international consensus behind 
extending CCP clearing across the OTC derivatives markets. However, as the debate 
has worn on, the sheer complexity of implementing new rules has caught up with 
legislators and has triggered divergence and even disagreement on a number of 
technical issues that promise to be critical to the effectiveness of reform.74 As a 
result, fundamental details about how this reform will work in practice still remain 
open, and even with the Dodd-Frank Act now signed into law in the US, it remains 
true to say that no jurisdiction has yet set down clear rules on fundamental issues 
such as which products will and will not be required to be cleared. 
There are clearly multiple drivers behind this complexity, including the fact that 
the debates are proceeding across different national and transnational jurisdictions 
simultaneously. But while the challenges of international coordination have been 
widely acknowledged,75 there has been a less coherent approach within the debates to 
                                                                                                                                               
73  DLA Piper, ‘Dodd-Frank Alert: Regulators Take Centre Stage’ (2010), at p. 1, available at: 
<http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/dodd-frank-act.pdf>. 
74  While the rest of this paper concentrates on the private law dimensions of the CCP 
prescription and discusses how this analysis might inform the regulatory debate, there are separate 
questions to be explored about the extent to which institutions responsible for reform are equipped 
to tackle questions of private law. The issue of institutional competence in respect of the private 
law aspects of the financial markets merits further research in light of current regulatory reform 
projects, but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
75  In particular, as regards the importance of a coordinated approach to standard setting for 
CCPs. International coordination is facilitated in this respect by the work of the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which are currently engaged in an ongoing 
review (at the G20’s request) of their recommendations for CCPs in light of the proposed extension 
of CCP clearing. 
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an equally important source of complexity: the fact that the CCP prescription 
incorporates into legislation CCP clearing, which is a private sector owned and 
operated risk management device, and a product of various private law techniques. 
Of course, certain aspects of the private nature of CCPs have had an impact upon 
the public debates about the CCP prescription. Expert witnesses from clearing house 
companies, trade associations, end-users and dealers gave detailed evidence to the 
House of Lords about how their businesses work, making a considerable impact on 
the Committee’s final report.76 The two public consultations by the European 
Commission sought the views of hundreds of parties from the private as well as 
public sectors.77 Nonetheless, I argue below that the public debates would benefit 
from addressing the private nature of CCPs upfront and in a more coherent way, 
rather than dealing with the implications as part of a long list of other issues. To put 
it another way, the debates described in this part of the paper have tended to centre 
on the question of how this particular reform should work in practice, at the expense 
of considering in detail the legal nature of the CCP device that the public sector is 
seeking to incorporate into legislation. As discussed in the next part of the paper, the 
nature of CCP clearing can be usefully explored as a matter of private law, and the 
benefit of this approach is that it helps to systematise the various problems thrown up 
in the public debates about this reform thus far. 
3. A PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVE ON CCP CLEARING 
CCP clearing works because of the interaction of various private law techniques. 
This means that taking into account the private law perspective is an important part 
of assessing the function and capacity of the device which the public sector is 
seeking to incorporate into regulatory reform. 
                                                                                                                                               
The European Commission has recently emphasised the need for global coordination in terms 
of these reforms, referencing the awaited review by CPSS/IOSCO. The same document also 
mentions the OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum which ‘was established to promote cooperation 
between regulators’: European Commission Proposal on OTC Derivatives, supra n. 62. The House 
of Lords European Union Committee has welcomed the Commission’s ‘acknowledgement of the 
need to develop a coordinated global approach in line with the work of CPSS and IOSCO’: HL EU 
Committee Report, supra n. 57, at p. 42. 
US legislation also acknowledges the need for international coordination. The Dodd-Frank Act, 
s 722, addresses the extraterritorial application of the legislation (but leaves key issues open). The 
Dodd-Frank Act, s 719(c), requires the CFTC and SEC within 18 months of the Act to jointly 
conduct a study into swap regulation, clearing house and clearing agency regulation in the US, Asia 
and Europe identifying ‘areas of regulation that could be harmonized’. 
76  See HL EU Committee Report, supra n. 57, at p. 46, Appendix 2 (List of Witnesses). 
77  As explained in European Commission, ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a 
Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories’, COM(2010) 484/5, 
2010/0250(COD), at pp. 3-4. 
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3.1 Private law and market-generated ‘legal devices’ 
As Waddams notes, ‘Anglo-American law has claimed many merits, but linguistic 
and conceptual precision are not among them’.78 However, in the financial markets 
literature, ‘private law’ typically refers to the legal norms used by private actors to 
‘create or alter private rights’79 as between themselves. This can be distinguished 
from the legal norms imposed on them ‘from outside’ by public actors such as 
legislators. Though the distinction between private and public actors may be a 
particularly artificial one in the context of what Black has described as the highly 
‘decentred’ and ‘hybrid’ context of financial regulation,80 it is possible to be more 
precise when addressing a particular sector of the markets. For example, in his 
critique of the role of ‘private law’ within the fragmented regulation of the deriva-
tives market Partnoy discusses the use of the standard form contracts created by the 
trade association ISDA.81 and the effects on derivative counterparties’ rights of the 
disclaimers therein.82 
Studies of private law in the financial markets are often preoccupied with the 
nature of the contracts, or even individual contractual terms, which market partici-
pants enter into with one another; hence the large literature about standard form 
contracts or boilerplate drafting in the sovereign debt,83 syndicated loan.84 and OTC 
derivatives markets.85 Valuable studies have highlighted how market actors use 
sophisticated standardised contracts and other drafting techniques to mitigate credit 
                                                                                                                                               
78  S. Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American 
Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2003), at p. 1. 
79  Black’s description of legal norms: J. Black, ‘Mapping the Contours of Contemporary 
Financial Services Regulation’, 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2002) p. 253, at p. 256. 
80  Black explores the ‘hybridity’ of decentred financial regulation by focusing on the 
‘extremely wide range of actors who are or potentially could be involved in the regulatory process’, 
Black, ibid., at p. 262. 
81  F. Partnoy, ‘The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation’, 22 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law (2001) p. 421, at p. 479. 
82  Ibid., at pp. 478-481. 
83  For example, A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study’, 
84 Washington University Law Review (2006) p. 1627; C. Bradley, ‘Private International Law-
Making for the Financial Markets’, 29 Fordham International Law Journal (2005) p. 127, at pp. 
160-164; and the first case study in S. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Contract as Statute’, 104 
Michigan Law Review (2005-6) p. 1129, at pp. 1133-1139. 
84  For example, Bradley, ibid., at pp. 166-170; Benjamin, supra n. 13, at pp. 157-170. 
85  For example, Partnoy, supra n. 81; Murray, supra n. 12; A. Riles, ‘The Anti-Network: 
Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State’, 56 American 
Journal of Comparative Law (2008) p. 605; J. Golden, ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: The 
Role of the Courts’, in I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien, eds., The Future of Financial Regulation 
(Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart 2010) (discussing the implications of post-crisis litigation for 
markets which use standardised contracts, making particular reference to the ISDA 
documentation); and Choi and Gulati, supra n. 83, at pp. 1139-1144. 
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risk when they are relatively unprotected by public sector rules,86 to send a signal to 
public authorities and other non-parties.87 and otherwise facilitate international 
transactions.88 
But there is more to private law in the financial markets than the skilful use of 
contracts and, in practice, parties often pursue their goals by deploying a number of 
legal techniques (such as asset-backing and netting) in combination with one another. 
For example, collateralisation in the OTC markets, as studied by Riles in her 
anthropological work on Japanese derivatives dealers, turns on the interaction of 
standardised contracts with the transfer of rights in property which together enable 
the parties to bypass national bankruptcy laws on the insolvency of a derivatives 
counterparty.89 Other examples of the deployment of interacting private law 
techniques are found in the use of special purpose vehicles in securitisation 
transactions (involving asset-backing, limited liability companies and trust struc-
tures),90 close-out netting as used in master agreements (standardised contracts, 
novation.91) and, most importantly for these purposes, central counterparty clearing. I 
collectively refer to these market-generated products of various private law 
techniques as ‘legal devices’. 
The relationship between these interacting legal techniques and the capacity of 
these legal devices is significant. These legal techniques do not simply explain how 
legal devices facilitate market activity but they also determine the inherent features 
of the devices, including their benefits, limitations and weak spots. Thus, studying 
the underlying legal techniques in detail is an important part of assessing the capacity 
of these private sector legal devices and it is especially relevant when, as in the case 
of the CCP prescription, such a device is to be incorporated into financial regulation 
by the public sector with the intention that it perform various regulatory functions. 
3.2 The private law techniques underlying CCP clearing 
The operation of CCP clearing turns on the interaction of a number of different legal 
techniques, which in turn define its capacity. The most important of these are 
considered below, along with the implications for the CCP prescription. 
The specific focus in the following discussion is on English law, though of course 
the worldwide reforms discussed in the preceding part of the paper above will 
implicate CCPs in numerous jurisdictions, operating on the basis of different 
                                                                                                                                               
86  Benjamin, supra n. 13, at pp. 233-240 and 256-7. 
87  Gelpern and Gulati, supra n. 83, at pp. 1712-1714. 
88  Riles, supra n. 85. 
89  Ibid., at pp. 610-612. 
90  As discussed in D. McBarnet, ‘Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, 
Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis’, in MacNeil and O’Brien, eds., supra n. 85, at pp. 70-72. 
91  Murray, supra n. 12, at pp. 291-293. See also the discussion of close-out netting in the 
context of the repo markets, in Benjamin, supra n. 13, at pp. 320-321. 
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governing law. However, it is submitted that the analytical approach developed here 
on the basis of an analysis of English law is applicable to CCPs in other jurisdictions. 
Meanwhile, the inevitable conflict of laws dimension to the CCP prescription, arising 
from the cross-border nature of the dealings that policymakers seek to regulate, is 
discussed briefly in section 4 of the paper. 
3.2.1 Novation and standardisation 
Perhaps the most fundamental legal point about CCP clearing is that the contracts in 
question are between the CCP and the members of the clearing system rather than 
between members themselves. This arrangement lies at the heart of the operation of 
CCP clearing, and it is reflected in the European Central Bank’s definition of a 
‘central counterparty’ as: 
An entity that interposes itself, in one or more markets, between the counterpar-
ties to the contracts traded, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to 
every buyer and thereby guaranteeing the performance of open contracts.92 
Depending on the structure of the clearing system in question, this outcome may be 
achieved either by members A and B contracting in the first instance with the CCP, 
or by A and B contracting with each other initially, with this contract then being 
replaced by new contracts between each member and the CCP.93 This latter 
arrangement depends on the legal technique of novation, which cancels one contract 
and replaces it with another. Novation is notable as the only means in English law 
whereby the benefits and burdens of a contract may effectively be transferred to a 
third party.94 Its capacity to bring about this ‘clean break’ allows the bilateral contract 
between A and B to be replaced by parallel contracts between A and the CCP and B 
and the CCP, with no rights and obligations (and therefore no counterparty risk) 
remaining between A and B. 
That the CCP becomes the ‘buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer’ 
underpins some of the most important benefits of the CCP prescription. As discussed 
further below, it means that the CCP can act as a shock absorber on the insolvency of 
a market participant. It also means that the CCP will be in a position to collect 
critical information about the market. As explained above, the opacity of the CDS 
market to date has become a particular cause of concern for regulators. As the FSA 
                                                                                                                                               
92  European Central Bank/Eurosystem, Glossary of Terms Related to Payment, Clearing and 
Settlement Systems (December 2009), at p. 4. 
93  See the detailed discussion of how these two alternatives work in a variety of different 
clearing systems provided by LCH in M. Yates, ‘UK Settlement’, in Blair and Walker, eds., supra 
n. 2, at pp. 321-324. 
94  For a discussion of a number of different English law techniques of transfer in the context of 
the financial markets, including novation, see Benjamin, supra n. 13, at pp. 528-531. 
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and HM Treasury have recently put it: ‘[I]mperfect market information also limits a 
regulator’s ability to monitor systemic risks and act to mitigate them’.95 In order to 
capitalise on this information-gathering function, the Dodd-Frank Act discussed 
above expressly provides for CCPs (as well as trade repositories and other market 
participants) to be required to furnish information to regulators to help them detect 
and deter market abuses.96 
To facilitate a CCP acting as buyer to every seller and vice versa (whether 
through novation or otherwise) the contracts being cleared would normally be in a 
standardised form. In terms of the underlying legal techniques, this can be under-
stood as contractual standardisation coming together with novation to facilitate the 
process of clearing. 
The debate about the CCP prescription in the OTC derivatives market has tended 
to proceed on the basis of three assumptions about contractual standardisation: that 
greater standardisation is a good thing; that only standardised OTC derivatives 
products can be cleared; and that all standardised products should be forced into a 
clearing system. However, a closer look at what is involved in CCP clearing and at 
the legal technique of contractual standardisation shows that qualifications should be 
made to each of these assumptions. 
First, the assumption that greater contractual standardisation in the OTC markets 
is a good thing. Across the debates since the crisis broke there has been widespread 
approval of increasing the use of standardised OTC derivatives documentation. As 
the FSA and HM Treasury have noted approvingly, ISDA is currently leading 
industry efforts to increase standardisation in particular OTC derivatives markets 
including CDS.97 Robert Pickel, the CEO of ISDA has observed that the ‘natural 
evolution of successful derivative products is in the direction of greater standardisa-
tion’98 and (writing before the crisis) Walker also described standardisation in the 
OTC markets as a ‘useful device’.99 
However, the implications of the wider use of standardised contracts deserve to 
be discussed more thoroughly as part of the debate about extending CCP clearing. As 
a practical point, the law firm Ashurst LLP raises the point that the meaning of 
‘standardised’ will be uncertain in practice, which may result in participants seeking 
legal opinions that their particular ‘contractual arrangement’ qualifies and should 
                                                                                                                                               
95  FSA and HM Treasury, supra n. 43, at p. 6. 
96  For example, as provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act, s 725(c), inserting a new Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7a-1(c)), s 5b(c)(2)(K) and (L), addressing the record-keeping and 
disclosure obligations of clearing houses. This provides that certain information is to be made 
public and disclosed to the CFTC, including the terms and conditions of each contract cleared, 
margin-setting methodology and daily settlement prices and volume. 
97  FSA and HM Treasury, supra n. 43, at p. 9. 
98  Pickel, supra n. 6, at p. S72. 
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therefore be cleared by a CCP, potentially passing on ‘unmanageable risk’.100 This 
raises the possibility of regulatory arbitrage by parties trying to get their contract 
cleared (rather than seeking to circumvent clearing requirements, which is the usual 
worry in the debates). Moreover, if the public sector mandates or otherwise works to 
increase the use of standardised documentation, this will have a knock-on effect on 
the regulatory role played by the trade associations or other actors responsible for 
producing it. Indeed, some academics have already expressed concern about the 
processes behind standard form documentation in the financial markets. For 
example, looking from the perspective of transparency and the processes of law-
making, Bradley has expressed concern that standard form contracts ‘can constrain 
or limit regulation’ and that the ‘processes which produce [them] are private and 
opaque to outsiders’.101 
The contract law literature also helps to shed light on the use and properties of 
standardised contracts in the financial markets.102 and provides a useful insight into 
the potential implications of increasing standardisation in this case. In particular, 
Collins has shown how contractual standardisation is a powerful tool which allows 
autonomous ‘club markets’ to transform ‘contracts into things’103 (or ‘objects of 
property’104), thereby making possible a trade in futures contracts. However, he also 
shows how this use of standardised contracts necessarily excludes the ‘unusually 
reflexive’ qualities of contract law ‘as a regulatory mechanism’.105 This means, for 
example, that parties may not negotiate to resolve disputes on their own terms. In 
other words, market participants necessarily sacrifice a wealth of rights afforded by 
the private law system in return for the benefits of participating in autonomous, 
organised markets.106 In the context of the OTC derivatives markets, some of those 
rights (for example, which allow parties to hedge specific risks, tailoring their 
contracts by reference to the nature and dates of exposure they are facing) may well 
be very important for certain participants. There has been some discussion relating to 
these issues in the debate about the CCP prescription so far; for example, it has been 
argued that the CCP prescription represents ‘further specific restrictions on 
derivative transactions’ and impacts upon parties’ freedom of contract.107 However, 
                                                                                                                                               
100  See the Memorandum by law firm Ashurst LLP, providing evidence to the House of Lords 
European Union Committee, reproduced at HL EU Committee Report, supra n. 57, p. 52, at p. 55. 
101  Bradley, supra n. 83, at p. 174. 
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103  H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999), at pp. 209-222. 
104  H. Collins, ‘Regulating Contract Law’, in C. Parker, et al., eds., Regulating Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2004), at p. 25. 
105  Ibid., at p. 24, discussing Collins, supra n. 103, at pp. 65-69. 
106  Ibid, at p. 26. 
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the principal focus to date has been those parties who will continue to require 
bespoke products (as discussed, for example, by HM Treasury in its evidence to the 
House of Lords Committee.108) rather than the constraints that standardised contracts 
impose on parties using them. 
The second assumption commonly made in the debate about the CCP prescription 
is that only standardised contracts can be cleared. For example, the European Central 
Bank/Eurosystem has stated that, ‘to be eligible for clearing a product must, as a 
minimum, be liquid, have price transparency and be standardised’.109 However, 
evidence put to the House of Lords European Union Committee by LCH.Clearnet 
made it clear that certain non-standardised contracts could be accepted for clearing 
by a clearing house, as is the case with their portfolio of swaps.110 Thus, standardisa-
tion is not an essential prerequisite for CCP clearing. Using standardisation as a 
shorthand to describe which contracts can or should be cleared is therefore an 
oversimplification; rather, standardisation is better understood as one of several 
factors affecting the decision of private clearing houses about the sorts of risks they 
are willing and able to manage.111 
The third common assumption is that the CCP prescription should involve forcing 
all standardised products onto clearing. This goes back to the G20’s statement that 
‘all standardized (sic) OTC derivatives’ should be cleared, which has been endorsed 
by the European Commission. However, considering this proposition from the point 
                                                                                                                                               
108  ‘Non-financial firms, in particular, have a legitimate need to transfer their risks using 
bespoke products.’ See Supplementary Letter from HM Treasury, HL EU Committee Report, supra 
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aviation fuel prices. See the Memorandum by British Airways, providing evidence to the House of 
Lords European Union Committee, reproduced at HL EU Committee Report, supra n. 57, pp. 68-71. 
109  European Central Bank/Eurosystem, supra n. 7, at p. 79. 
110  Transcript, Examination of Witnesses R. Liddell (Chief Executive) and R. Cunningham 
(Director of Public Affairs) LCH.Clearnet, HL EU Committee Report, supra n. 57, pp. 46-7, Q126. 
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111  LCH.Clearnet has stated that ‘the fundamental requirement for eligibility is that the CCP 
can manage the default of a participant through the implementation of both its risk management 
and default management policies in a way that controls systemic risk’. It has stated that there are 
four main considerations for the clearing house in this regard, which can be summarised as: the 
assurance of market liquidity; availability and reliability of market prices; CCP default 
management procedures; and cost of providing clearing service and maintaining risk management 
structures. See Memorandum by LCH.Clearnet, providing evidence to the House of Lords 
European Union Committee, reproduced at HL EU Committee Report, supra n. 57, p. 39, at p 41. 
The Future and Options Association (FOA) gave the following as example of factors affecting 
clearing eligibility: ‘pricing transparency, liquidity, volatility, risk complexity, valuation capability 
and the risk management capacity of the CCP’. See Memorandum by the FOA, providing evidence 
to the House of Lords European Union Committee, reproduced at HL EU Committee Report, supra 
n. 57, p. 88, at p 90. 
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of view of CCP clearing systems shows that if this proposal were taken literally, it 
could have an adverse effect on the stability and risk management of clearing houses. 
As the House of Lords Committee put it: ‘CCPs are privately owned companies, 
which can currently refuse to clear products where they feel they cannot manage the 
associated risk and this system has worked well even during the financial crisis’.112 
Being able to select which products to clear goes to the heart of the risk management 
practised by CCPs and this might mean that some standardised contracts are not in 
fact clearable. If legislation were to force CCPs to clear, for example, illiquid but 
standardised products, this could adversely affect their ability to manage their own 
risk. In short, CCP clearing systems could become more vulnerable if their own 
decisions about which contracts to clear were overridden by public sector rules. 
Weakening the resilience of CCPs would, of course, be disastrous and ultimately risk 
defeating the object of this legislative exercise. 
Thus, the legal technique of standardisation is central to the debate about the CCP 
prescription, because of how CCP clearing works as a matter of law. However, 
certain assumptions by policymakers have oversimplified the relationship between 
clearing eligibility and standardisation. An overly blunt legislative definition of those 
products which must be cleared could threaten the autonomy of CCPs to choose what 
to accept for clearing. While it will be a significant weakening of the original goal to 
clear all standardised contracts, the legislative definition of the products that must be 
cleared must provide (as US legislation does) for the CCPs to retain control of which 
products they clear. Overall, a more nuanced approach to ‘clearing eligibility’ than 
has been shown by some authorities to date is going to be necessary for CCPs to 
work safely and effectively within a new legislative framework. 
3.2.2 Financial collateral and asset-backing 
Benjamin describes the provision of financial collateral as ‘the use of financial assets 
in security, quasi-security or title transfer collateral arrangements’.113 In turn, she 
collectively describes these legal techniques as asset-backing, whereby ‘the credit 
exposure of the position taker is addressed by earmarking particular assets to meet its 
claims’.114 Asset-backing is an important feature of CCP clearing as members are 
required to post financial collateral as margin to cover their exposures to the CCP. 
As discussed above, the novation of members’ contracts to the CCP means that if 
one member were to default, the CCP would still owe the corresponding obligations 
to other members. Thus, this collateral is a vital first (but not only.115) line of defence 
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for the CCP in the case of the failure of a market participant. LCH.Clearnet, for 
example, reported to the House of Lords Committee that it held ‘initial margin’ 
(explained below) totalling £50 billion. Moreover, it reported that its holding of $2 
billion of initial margin in respect of Lehman Brothers easily absorbed the out-
standing obligations owed to counterparties on the bank’s default in 2008.116 
Looking at the legal nature of members’ asset-backing obligations more pre-
cisely, members are required to post collateral as transactions are registered (initial 
margin) and then from time to time as provided for by the clearing house rules 
(variation margin).117 Yates notes that under the LCH Rules, initial margin may be 
provided in the form of various assets identified in LCH’s General Regulations, but 
variation margin must be provided in the form of cash.118 The significance of posting 
collateral in cash is not only, as Benjamin notes, that it is the most sought after form 
of financial collateral and therefore highly in demand.119 but also that upon its transfer 
to the collateral-taker (the CCP), the collateral provider becomes a creditor of the 
CCP.120 Moreover, the CCP’s enforcement of rights against the cash collateral will be 
by way of set off, as between the credit balance of the member’s account (the debt 
the CCP owes to the member) and the member’s liabilities (its debt to the CCP).121 
In contrast, when members post collateral in the form of non-cash assets, the 
member may retain property rights in the collateral. In the LCH context, for example, 
Yates describes how members provide collateral in the form of non-cash assets (e.g., 
securities) by transferring the assets to an account with LCH and granting LCH a 
security interest, i.e., LCH takes a first fixed charge to secure the member’s 
performance of its obligations.122 This arrangement means that the member retains 
property rights in the asset which are, by definition, enforceable against third parties 
and survive the collateral-taker’s insolvency.123 There is a clear contrast between the 
                                                                                                                                               
116  Ibid., at p. 29. 
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position of the member in this case and the position if it has provided cash collateral, 
where it would merely have personal rights as an unsecured creditor of the CCP. 
The legal effects flowing from the use of various types of financial collateral and 
asset-backing techniques may not, traditionally, have been at the forefront of market 
participants’ minds. However, the insolvency of Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (LBIE), an important prime broker holding the assets of many hundreds of 
counterparties,124 has recently brought home the enormous implications of such legal 
details, albeit in a different context within the markets. In the immediate aftermath of 
LBIE’s collapse, certain funds resorted to applying (unsuccessfully) for a court order 
seeking information about their assets, on the basis that they had been brought to the 
brink of ruin by the delay in the return of their assets while administrators tried to 
untangle the highly complex arrangements used by LBIE.125 The extension of CCPs 
to new and vast areas of the market will mean that these potentially complex legal 
details will become even more significant for the markets. 
Moreover, these asset-backing requirements may have an adverse economic 
effect on ‘thinly capitalised’ market participants, and PFI/PPP project companies are 
cited in this context by the FSA and HM Treasury.126 So, on top of the legal risks 
which collateralisation represents, the extended use of CCP clearing will also mean 
more pressure on good quality financial collateral and the possibility of some parties 
having to borrow to meet asset-backing requirements. 
3.2.3 Netting: non-insolvency 
CCP clearing allows all of members’ positions to be netted in the ordinary course of 
events, i.e., when no members are insolvent. One benefit of this is that gross sums 
due between parties are replaced by a single net sum (owed to or by the CCP). This 
reduces parties’ exposures and takes the pressure off the settlement infrastructure. 
The importance of this latter, operational point should not be underestimated. As 
Wood notes, in the late 1960s and early 1970s: ‘[S]everal major United States 
brokerage firms failed primarily because of their inability to process transactions. If 
buys and sells and corresponding payments can be netted, millions can be reduced to 
thousands.’127 
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It is the case that, outside insolvency, parties could achieve similar effects without 
the use of a CCP through careful contractual drafting. For example, parties may 
provide for multilateral netting, where all of the rights and obligations between 
multiple parties are replaced by a single sum owed to or by each party. Wood 
describes this as the ‘non-mutual set-off of claims’ noting that the objective is ‘to 
minimise the number of actual transfers and circuity of contracts’.128 This contractual 
multilateral netting may be supported by a clearing house, though in this case its 
function would simply be to calculate the single sums owed to or by each party at the 
end of the payment cycle. In British Eagle International Airlines Ltd. v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France,129 this sort of contractual multilateral netting was deployed by 
member airlines which owed money to and were owed money by each other because, 
for operational convenience, they sold tickets for services to be provided by other 
airlines. Facilitated by a clearing house (IATA), the arrangements brought consider-
able operational advantages: in one year, only nine per cent of gross sums owing 
between the members actually fell to be paid.130 
If netting may be effected by the terms of the contracts between parties, why is 
CCP clearing useful? In addition to the operational advantages mentioned already, 
the main reason is that multilateral netting arrangements provided for in contracts 
will not survive the insolvency of one of the participants, as was famously held in 
British Eagle. In other words, as Wood says of such contract-based multilateral 
netting arrangements ‘there is no objection to this as long as all parties are sol-
vent’.131 Novating to the CCP overcomes this problem. 
3.2.4 Netting: insolvency of a CCP member 
One of the principal attractions of the CCP clearing is the capacity of the device to 
minimise market disruption on the insolvency of a market participant. For instance, 
evidence given to the House of Lords European Union Committee described how, on 
the administration of Lehman Brothers, the clearing house LCH.Clearnet was able to 
‘liquidate the portfolio and settle outstanding obligations to counterparties … 
[allowing] Lehman Brothers to default without significant adverse effects on its 
counterparties’.132 
But how, as a matter of law, does a CCP provide this effect? The House of Lords 
in the British Eagle case made clear that the CCP’s capacity to handle the insolvency 
of a member turns on the process of novation; it also showed what happens to 
multilateral clearing arrangements on the insolvency of a member in the absence of a 
CCP. 
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In British Eagle, contractual provisions effected multilateral netting of rights and 
obligations between member airlines. However, when one member went into 
liquidation, the contractual provisions for multilateral netting were held to be 
ineffective in the face of the contrary provisions of the insolvency rules, which 
required bilateral netting.133 As Lord Cross explained in the leading speech on behalf 
of the majority, ‘[s]uch a “contracting out” must, to my mind, be contrary to public 
policy’.134 Thus, in the absence of novation to a CCP, the liquidators of the bankrupt 
airline were left able to pursue the debtors of the airline for sums owing to it, while 
its creditors had separately to prove their claims. 
In the more recent High Court of Australia case of Ansett,135 the majority found 
the amended version of the IATA clearing scheme to be effective, notwithstanding 
the administration of a participant. Significantly, the drafting of the new scheme did 
not in fact effect novation. However, IATA submitted, and the majority agreed, that: 
under the Clearing House arrangements no liability to effect payment arises 
between airlines and that the only debt or credit which arises is that between 
IATA and the member airline in relation to the final, single balance of all items 
entered for the relevant clearance. This is the consequence of the bargain struck 
by airlines such as Ansett when they became parties to the relevant multilateral 
agreements. That construction of the Clearing House arrangements should be 
accepted.136 
This case has important implications for the drafting of clearing house rules, though 
it is submitted that it does not disrupt the central point that novation to a CCP 
remains the safest and most conventional way of achieving the shock absorber effect 
on a member’s insolvency. It is also worth noting that Ansett has attracted academic 
criticism for being ‘generous to the architects of the scheme and somewhat 
unconvincing in its conclusions’.137 
In practice then, novation to the CCP means that upon settlement each member of 
the clearing system owes a net sum of money to or is owed a net sum by the CCP. 
The members will have to post collateral accordingly. On the default of a member, 
other members’ obligations to pay and be paid stand. The collateral taken by the 
CCP can be used to meet the CCP’s losses because of the default, though, as ISDA 
explained in evidence to the House of Lords Committee, in the first instance the CCP 
may look to other clearing members to assume the contracts which the defaulting 
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member had on its books.138 Thus, through a combination of novation, netting and 
collateralisation CCP clearing protects the markets from disruption on the default of 
a participant. 
However, as Benjamin points out, ‘financial law cannot reduce risk, but only 
moves it from person to person’.139 In the context of CCPs, this reminds us that while 
members are protected from direct exposure to counterparty insolvency risk, this risk 
is assumed by the CCP itself. Therefore, as the Turner Review made clear, the CCP 
prescription depends (like all CCP clearing) on ‘robust and resilient central clearing 
house arrangements for CDS clearing’.140 This explains why it is so important that 
any rules about which contracts are to be cleared do not undermine risk management 
by clearing houses (as noted above). It also explains why the debate about the 
regulation and supervision of CCPs, already an important ongoing issue at an 
international level, has become intertwined with that surrounding the CCP prescrip-
tion.141 
3.2.5 Members’ contractual relations 
The final private law component of CCP clearing discussed here is the contractual 
relationship between the clearing house and the users of its services. This is 
sometimes overlooked in discussions of CCP clearing and has not received much 
attention in the debate about the CCP prescription so far. However, it is important in 
practice since the CCP prescription has the potential to introduce another layer of 
complexity into the markets. 
Parties contracting with a CCP in the manner described must be members of the 
clearing house. The relationship between the CCP and its members is governed by a 
membership agreement.142 Crucially, in light of the CCP’s assumption of the 
insolvency risk of participants, there are criteria which parties have to meet before 
they are accepted as members of the clearing system. Yates notes that in LCH’s case, 
these relate to matters including ‘net capital, appropriate staff and systems’.143 Yates 
observes that parties may either be individual clearing members (able to clear their 
own trades only) or general clearing members (able to clear their own trades and also 
those of customers who are not members themselves).144 However, members contract 
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with the CCP as principals, even when they are entering into transactions for a 
client.145 Needless to say, the law may become quite complex in this area, for 
example as to whether the non-member is bound by rules and customs of the market 
(here the clearing service) of which it is ignorant.146 Yates explains that in the case of 
LCH, where a member is acting as the agent for a non-member using the clearing 
services, the member must clear the contract through another general clearing 
member because otherwise it would be in the position of providing a service to its 
customer as agent and principal.147 General clearing members are also required to 
maintain separate accounts with LCH in respect of house (its own) transactions and 
client transactions. This separation is extremely important for purposes such as 
collateralisation. 
There has been some concern expressed about how these arrangements will work 
in the context of the CCP prescription. For example, a recent European Central 
Bank/Eurosystem report flagged up what it called the ‘non-trivial legal issues that 
will need to be addressed’ before arrangements allowing non-dealers trading with 
clearing members to enjoy the benefits of CCP clearing will become widespread.148 
The FSA and HM Treasury have also expressed concern that legal arrangements 
allowing non-members access to clearing are sufficiently robust, and regulators are 
apparently monitoring progress in this respect.149 
The framers of legislation mandating CCP clearing therefore need to fully con-
sider the problems arising from the capacity of different sorts of market participants 
to access clearing services. Not all parties which currently enter contracts caught by 
new legislation will be willing or able to meet the criteria to be clearing members 
themselves, and the corporate end-users of derivatives hedging business risk again 
come to mind. Moreover, to the extent that such parties rely on members of the 
clearing service, there is potential for considerable legal complexity to result from 
the nature of arrangements which they make. This would be an unwelcome by-
product of reform and suggests that it would be sensible either to streamline the 
means of accessing clearing services for non-financial entities entering relatively low 
values of deals for the purposes of commercial hedging (perhaps by means of a 
publicly owned clearing house for non-financial entities only, with lower entry 
criteria and a maximum limit on participations) or, as the proposed EU Regulation 
does in some circumstances, to exempt these users entirely from mandatory clearing 
requirements. 
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3.3 Private law and the capacity of CCPs 
To sum up, this analysis shows how the legal techniques underpinning CCP clearing 
help to define the capacity of this device. As shown, CCP clearing means that 
settlement volumes are reduced, netting facilitated, counterparty risk removed and 
the markets are insulated should a participant fail. However, the underlying legal 
techniques mean that there are limitations built into CCP clearing too. Most 
importantly perhaps, because of how novation works, risk will concentrate in the 
CCP itself, its own robustness thereby becoming an issue of systemic importance. As 
a private entity, the clearing house’s own management of risk remains crucial, 
including judging for itself which types of product can be cleared safely. Further-
more, a private law analysis also shows how complexity, legal risk and cost can arise 
as by-products of contractual relations between members, non-members and the 
CCP, of the increased use of standardised products and of all-important (as Lehman 
Brothers showed) asset-backing requirements. 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEBATE ABOUT THE CCP PRESCRIPTION 
As I have argued, CCP clearing may usefully be understood as a private sector legal 
device, though this aspect of CCP clearing has not been addressed in a coherent way 
in the debates about the CCP prescription so far. It follows that taking stock of how 
CCP clearing works with reference to the private law underlying the device offers a 
means with which to reconsider the complex debate surrounding the CCP prescrip-
tion, including that following on from framework legislation such as the Dodd-Frank 
Act. More specifically, this approach assists by isolating two different types of 
challenges presented by the process of debating and implementing this reform. 
In the first place, the analysis above has highlighted certain drawbacks associated 
with CCP clearing, such as the build-up of risk in the CCP itself. Because these risks, 
limits and other potential problems originate in the legal workings of the device, they 
are an inherent and unavoidable part of CCP clearing. Thus, policymakers intent on 
incorporating CCP clearing into the regulatory response to the financial crisis need to 
recognise and confront this category of problems as part of the process of designing 
new legislation. 
However, these drawbacks need to be distinguished from a second and distinct 
type of challenge which relates to the technical implementation of the reform rather 
than to the inherent legal capacity of the underlying device. There are several 
difficult and pressing challenges of this nature facing policymakers, a good example 
of which is the global coordination of reform. As has been recognised by many of the 
parties involved, it is going to be essential to coordinate new rules mandating CCP 
clearing across different jurisdictions (e.g., as to the defined terms framing the 
clearing requirement in each case), as the OTC derivatives markets are sophisticated, 
global and adept at seeking opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. However, 
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policymakers implementing the CCP prescription not only have to coordinate their 
rules; they must also take account of the enormously complex conflict of laws 
dimension to these reforms. Private international law relating to choice of law and 
jurisdiction, the holding of cross-border financial collateral, netting, insolvency and 
financial collateral is relevant here. The litigation generated by the administration of 
Lehman Brothers (which, it is estimated, may last a decade) is an ongoing reminder 
of the complexities which arise due to the global nature of the financial markets 
generally and of the complexities of cross-border interests in financial collateral in 
particular.150 Taking account of the private international law dimension of new rules 
mandating clearing accordingly represents a huge challenge for those seeking to 
implement the CCP prescription. 
The thesis of this paper is that the challenges relating to regulatory arbitrage and 
conflict of laws are complex and pressing but of a different quality to those arising 
from the capacity of CCP clearing per se. Similarly, decisions about where CCPs 
should be located.151 or the regulatory methods that are most appropriate for the 
potentially diverse class of non-clearable contracts turn on issues which are different 
from those flowing from the mechanics of CCP clearing itself. This distinction is 
significant because the former are challenges which, in an ideal world, could be pre-
empted by regulatory coordination and the careful drafting of new rules, whereas the 
latter are not. The differences between these two types of problem may therefore be 
summarised as in Table 1 below. 
As this analysis makes clear, both these sets of challenges need to be addressed in 
the process of implementing the CCP prescription. Both have come up in the global 
debates in one form or another, but there are advantages in differentiating between 
them. Not least, this approach allows the debate to be ordered in a more systematic 
way, which is preferable to policymakers attempting to address qualitatively 
different issues all together and across multiple forums simultaneously. 
How this framework may apply in practice varies depending on the stage of the 
debates, and it also has potential as a means with which to critique eventual draft, 
primary or secondary legislation on this issue. One suggestion is that the framework 
could be used to organise the process of producing draft legislation as follows: as the 
                                                                                                                                               
150  See, for example, the conflicting decisions reached by the Court of Appeal in Perpetual 
Trustee Company Limited v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and ors [2009] EWCA Civ 
1160 and by Judge Peck of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in Ch 
11 Case No. 08-13555. Adv. No. 09-01242 (25 January 2010), anticipated in Perpetual Trustee 
Company Limited v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited [2009] EWHC 2953 (Ch) and 
discussed further in C. Brown and T. Cleary, ‘Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on OTC 
Derivatives in Structured Debt Transactions’, 5 Capital Markets Law Journal (2010) p. 218. The 
conflict of laws complexities arising in connection with global securities holdings and the use of 
financial collateral were pointed out presciently in Benjamin and Yates, supra n. 120, at chapter 5. 
151  There are currently divergent views about the location of CCPs. For example, the Turner 
Review argues that the European Commission’s proposal that there needs to be a CCP in the euro 
zone is ‘unnecessary for financial stability reasons’, Turner Review, supra n. 10, at pp. 82-83. 
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challenges relating to technical implementation need to be pre-empted and most 
obviously require international cooperation, these should be regarded as ‘first order’ 
issues for national and international authorities (including IOSCO and CPSS) to 
address in a coordinated way and as a priority. Given that the CCP prescription will 
only be effective if these issues are addressed, authorities should regard these matters 
as pre-conditions to a separate round of discussion addressing the inherent challenges 
relating to the legal capacity of CCP clearing, which could be held in closer 
consultation with the CCP industry and users of clearing services themselves. Thus, 
the different qualities of the challenges relating to legal and technical implementation 
issues would be recognised and policymakers would be afforded the opportunity to 
address each effectively rather than in an ad hoc way. 
Table 1: Differentiating challenges relating to the CCP prescription 
 Challenges relating to 
legal capacity 
Challenges relating to 
technical implementation 
Examples • Risk concentrated in CCPs 
themselves. 
• Clearing eligibility: requires 
liquidity, standardisation, 
clearing house discretion. 
• Complexity, risk and cost of legal 
arrangements, e.g., collateralisa-
tion, membership. 
• Risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
• Impact of private international law. 
• Where will CCPs be located? 
• How to regulate non-clearable 
products: higher capital charges? 
 
Source Underlying legal techniques which 
define the benefits and limits of 
CCP clearing. 
Process of implementing new rules for 
cross-border markets, particularly on a 
multi-jurisdictional basis. 
Strategy  Challenges are inevitable and need 
to be recognised and addressed 
upfront. 
 
Challenges need to be pre-empted by 
the careful drafting of new rules, by 
recognition of the limited capacity of 
CCP clearing and by international 
coordination. 
5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This is a significant moment in the history of financial regulation. As MacNeil and 
O’Brien put it, the public sector’s rescue of the banking system means that the 
‘power and influence of government within the regulatory matrix has been aug-
mented considerably’.152 As shown in this paper, the OTC derivatives sector has 
become a target for duly empowered national and international authorities and the 
CCP prescription for the OTC derivatives market has accumulated a good deal of 
                                                                                                                                               
152  I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien, ‘Introduction’, in MacNeil and O’Brien, eds., supra n. 85, at p. 1. 
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momentum behind it. However, implementing these proposals has sparked a 
complex and transnational debate which has not yet yielded finalised legislation 
(outside the US) or precise rules about how the mechanism will work in practice 
(even in the US). The argument that I have made in this paper is that within these 
debates greater recognition should be paid to the fact that CCP clearing is first and 
foremost a private sector legal device, constructed from private law techniques to 
serve the market. 
From this starting point, I have argued that the debate about implementing the 
CCP prescription by means of new legislation would be advanced if the private law 
techniques underpinning it were acknowledged clearly and in detail. Amongst other 
benefits, this helps to isolate limitations built into CCP clearing from challenges 
relating to the technical implementation of the reform. Systematising the questions of 
detail thrown up by this reform would, I have argued, be a constructive step towards 
effective primary and secondary legislation. 
It is in many ways disappointing that a proposal like the CCP prescription should 
start off with so much high-profile support but nonetheless become so bogged down 
in technical detail. Importing a regulatory solution from the private sector has likely 
proved more controversial than advocates expected – there are still vitally important 
questions about the reform which are unresolved, after two years of discussions. But 
a private law analysis at least helps to make sense of it all by showing where the 
complexity comes from the legal mechanics of CCP clearing and where it does not. 
